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'Rule by Tycoon' Consolidated
The new ministerial system promises
accountability without democracy
Union
Action June 2002
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July
1, marks the fifth anniversary of Hong Kong's reunification
with China and the founding of the Special Administrative
Region (SAR). On the same day the territory will undergo
one of the most far-reaching political changes since
the end of British colonialism. The incumbent Chief
Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, will begin his second fiver-year
term supported by a new circle of political appointees
- 14 'ministers' who will be accountable not to the
legislature, or to the public at large, but to the Beijing-appointed
Chief Executive himself. This new ministerial system,
ironically labelled the 'Principal
Officials Accountability System', further diminishes
hopes of a democratic transition in Hong Kong.
The 'accountability system' involves the political appointment
of a top layer of Principal Officials or 'ministers'
who will assume key policy portfolios and run the civil
service. All statutory powers now exercised by policy
secretaries will be transferred to the new 'ministers.'
As a result, the policy secretaries will no longer be
career civil servants, but will be political appointees
on contract. They are not only appointed by the Chief
Executive, but can be fired by him - a newfound power
that he didn't have over civil servants serving as policy
secretaries. In effect the new ministers will be directly
accountable to Tung Chee-hwa, and to him alone. They
are not elected and do not need the approval of the
legislature to assume their posts. Of course, the Chief
Executive himself is not elected, but is appointed by
a select committee of 800, contingent on the approval
of the central government in Beijing (see Union Action
March 2002: 'Whose Voices?').
Further changes under the new 'accountability' or ministerial
system involve the merger of 16 government departments
into 11. This includes the merger of the environment
and transport bureaus and the incorporation of the labour
portfolio into the commerce and industry bureau. At
the same time, the incumbent directors of government
bureaus will maintain civil servant status, but will
be re-titled 'Permanent Secretaries.'
Upon assuming office as political appointees, the ministers
will automatically become members of the Executive Council
(Exco), strengthening the already excessive power wielded
by executive arm of government. In contrast, the legislative
arm of government, the Legislative Council (Legco),
remains severely restricted. Only 24 of the 60 seats
in Legco are elected by universal suffrage. Not only
can the government ensure a pro-Beijing, pro-business
majority by allocating seats to the professional sectors,
it also severely restricts what the legislature can
do. Private members may introduce bills, but only if
they do not "relate to public expenditure or political
structure or the operation of government." If a bill
does affect government spending or operations, then
it must receive prior approval from the Chief Executive.
The limitations are obvious. In the past bills on collective
bargaining and anti-union discrimination were blocked
on the grounds that they would affect both the government's
operation and public spending (see 'Minimum
wage bill defeated'). Any amendment of government
bills or ultimate legislative approval of members' bills
requires approval of both sectors of Legco. That is,
approval by a majority vote among the 30 functional
constituency members and a majority in the other half
of Legco.
The restrictions on Legco are combined with virtually
impossible conditions for the democratic revision of
the Basic Law itself. Article 159 stipulates that amendments
to electoral provisions in the Basic Law require approval
of the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee
in Beijing. Any local proposal to do so requires the
local NPC delegates (chosen by a mainland appointed
body) and two-thirds of Legco, as well as the Chief
Executive's approval. So while the Basic Law allows
for the possibility of the direct election of the Chief
Executive and full direct elections of Legco seats after
2007, serious political obstacles remain. The new ministerial
system, which tightens the Chief Executive's authoritarian
hold on power, is a major new obstacle in this process.
Details of these changes were revealed only weeks before
the July 1 deadline. Only 31 days passed between the
Chief Executive's speech outlining the details of the
new system and its implementation. Less than two weeks
before the system was to come into effect the Chief
Executive still gave no public explanation of who the
appointees were. The fact that these far-reaching political
reforms were shrouded in secrecy until just prior to
their execution illustrates the complete lack of accountability
to be expected under the new 'accountability' system.
Yet despite the secrecy and restrictions on any serious
public debate, government officials called for a quick
end to discussions. Angered by the challenges raised
by democrats and unionists in Legco, the head of Exco,
Leung Chun-ying, claimed that public discussion and
debate had gone on for "too long" and that "no more
questions should be raised."
In his speech to Legco on April 17, the Chief Executive
claimed that in devising the new accountability system,
"We have listened closely to the views of the community...."
Yet at the time of Tung Chee-hwa's speech no one in
the community had a clear idea of what the new accountability
system was. A public opinion poll conducted by the government
that claims 65% support for the new accountability system
in fact only asks if respondents want a "more accountable
government." The answer is obvious for most people.
But wanting an accountable government has little to
do with the new system designed to enhance the power
of the Chief Executive. An independent survey by the
Chinese University of Hong Kong showed that 66% oppose
the proposal that the Chief Executive wield the power
to hire and fire the new ministers.
In fact, in his speech to Legco, Tung Chee-hwa referred
to public opinion surveys as a key tool for gauging
public sentiment. Such surveys will supposedly be a
key element in Principal Officials' knowing when they
have failed. This is ironic given the Chief Executive's
intolerance for opinion polls that show his unpopularity.
In July 2000 it was revealed that he used political
pressure to put a stop to public opinion polls conducted
by Hong Kong University because the results showed his
declining popularity and deteriorating government credibility.
This intolerance of criticism may soon be taken to extremes
with the proposed introduction of anti-sedition laws
during Tung's next five-year term (see 'Tougher
Measures').
Ultimately Tung Chee-hwa's public statements on the
new ministerial system carry a basic message: the 'accountability
system' is intended to act as a substitute for democracy.
It's that simple. By suppressing calls for universal
suffrage as the only genuine form of accountability,
the Chief Executive is able to consolidate his own power
and better serve the interests of Beijing and big business.
Over the past five years more than 75% of appointees
to various legislative and advisory bodies were from
the pro-Beijing business elite, institutionalizing government
collusion with big business. Tung Chee-hwa now plans
to appoint additional Principal Officials to his 'cabinet'
from the private corporate sector, thereby consolidating
'rule by tycoon' in the territory.
In an amendment put forward by the Democratic Party
and backed by HKCTU in Legco on May 30, it was proposed
that the introduction of the accountability system be
tied to the introduction of universal suffrage. Speaking
in Legco, HKCTU General Secretary Lee Cheuk-yan declared:
"We support an accountability system, under a democratic
system."
On June 19, only 12 days before the commencement of
the ministerial system, the government forced through
legislation in Legco which transferred statutory powers
to the new political appointees. Seven major amendments
were proposed by pro-democracy Councillors, but all
were defeated as a result of restrictions on LegCo powers
and control by non-elected, pro-Beijing interests. Protesting
the "total disrespect for the legislature and total
disrespect for the Hong Kong people", Lee Cheuk-yan,
together with HKCTU President, Lau Chin-shek and unionist
Leung Yiu-chung, walked out in protest.
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