HKCTU has already voiced its concerns at the alarming trend towards political centralisation developing in Hong Kong through the pages of Union Action. In 2001, for example, administrative reforms called the 'Principal Officials Accountability System' concentrated more power in the hands of the SAR's non-elected Chief Executive, Tung Chee-Hwa. Other indications of this trend include the post-1997 amendments to the Societies and Public Order Ordinances, and legal precedents set during the Right of Abode issue in which the National People's Congress in Beijing reversed a judgement made by Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal.

       But perhaps the gravest threat to the development of democracy in the territory comes in the form of unpopular and unwarranted legislation based on Article 23 of the Basic Law. Touted as 'national security' legislation, 60,000 protestors pointed out in December that Article 23 laws will only serve to undermine Hong Kong's safety by restricting the flow of information, infringing on the human rights and freedom of the people of Hong Kong, further restricting civil society in favour of further concentrating power in the hands of economic and political elites. The previous issue of Union Action led on how we believe the proposed legislation will damage independent trade unions in Hong Kong.

       The campaign to stop Article 23 again hit the streets on July 1st 2003 in what can only be describes as a tidal wave of discontent - not just at the proposed legislation, but at the government in general and Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa in particular. In short, "people power" arrived in Hong Kong as over half million people demonstrated against the government. The scenes were reminiscent of the Philippines in 1986 when people power led to the fall of the dictator President Marcos. Alongside the slogans against Article 23, were resounding and repeated calls for Tung to step down. Since the giant march, there have been two mass rallies involving over 70,000 people calling for an elected government in Hong Kong.

       The demonstration changed Hong Kong's political landscape and has plunged the Beijing appointed government of Hong Kong into crisis as sections of Hong Kong's political elite moved to distant themselves from the Tung government. James Tien, leader of the pro-business Liberal Party resigned his position on the Executive Council forcing the government to announce a dramatic postponement of Article 23 legislation. The government has also announced concessions to some parts of the bill. The following pages are a snapshot analysis of why so many people turned up on the July 1 demonstration and how the government's incompetence, thrown into stark relief during the SARS crisis, have brought us to political crisis that has crystallised on the issue of Article 23.

Growing Incompetence - Growing Anger

       For many in Hong Kong, the flaws in the proposed legislation were exposed during the Tung administration's handling of SARS, in essence a very real threat to public security and safety. Hong Kong's experience with the outbreak clearly underlined the dangers of Article 23 legislation, and the antiquated 'rule by tycoon' system that it wishes to consolidate. If the public can take anything positive from those frightening days, it is the knowledge that such features as participatory democracy, full transparency, and popular accountability are essential components for the safety, security, and survival of a modern society.

       The lack of such factors during the early days of the SARS outbreak, in particular the lack of accountability and transparency, threatened the security and lives of Hong Kong people. Details about the disease and extent of the outbreak were initially covered-up over fears of affecting investment and having a negative impact on industries, such as tourism, airlines, and retail sales. The initial refusal to admit there was a serious problem at the Princess of Wales Hospital, at the heart of the outbreak, was a major mistake and testament to the government's natural reaction to cover-up. Rather than keeping the public fully informed through an uninhibited flow of information, the government sought to protect the interests of economic elites by being vague and selective about the details that it released.

       Article 23 legislation includes revisions to the Official Secrets Ordinance. The proposals put forward would make it problematic for newspapers or other information providers to report on sensitive issues. In the case of SARS, the Central Government in Beijing's withholding of information related to the outbreak is an example of how such tactics can aggravate the outbreak and risks to ordinary citizens. In Hong Kong, publication of the number of SARS cases and listings of infected areas in newspapers and independent websites were crucial to the public staying informed about the extent of the outbreak, and knowing what precautions to take.

       The July 1 march did succeed in forcing concessions over the issue of sensitive and 'secret' information. The Tung government agreed that "public interest" could be used as a defence for disclosure of "official secrets". Yet doubts still remain. Under Section 16A of the proposals, it is an offence to disclose information relating to affairs of the HKSAR that, under the Basic Law, are within the responsibility of the Central Authorities. This new category of protected information is vague and could cover many different areas of interaction between Hong Kong and the Mainland including commercial and economic information. The concession on "public interest" does nothing to clarify the overall offence.



       As pressure increased on the government from many sectors, it became apparent that keeping quiet about SARS achieved little in preventing fear and encouraging confidence, even among the powerful economic actors. Sluggish markets and a general slump in economic activity forced government officials to shift to rhetoric of aggressive reassurance. In terms of direct industry relief, the US$1.5 billion SARS relief package offered by Tung Chee-hwa, for example, was directed at cutting operating costs for industries by providing rebates on taxes and licensing fees, along with other specific charges. The government did not seem to consider HKCTU proposals that the money be used for compensating or reducing the significant pressures on Hong Kong's working people who bore the economic brunt of the disease in one way or another. Thousands of hotel workers laid off following a slump in room occupancy were all but ignored by Tung who contented himself with a few token suggestions on short-term re-employment measures. The government's latest "relief" policy created only 8,000 jobs, paying as little as $US350-400 a month for full time work.

       Yet the relief for big business and the tired platitudes beseeching the people of Hong Kong to support and have faith in the government in a time of emergency only served to further anger millions of Hong Kong citizens. In fact, appeals for undeserved trust has also been the administration's line all along regarding Article 23: the government knows best and should be trusted to ensure the safety of the people by adopting "national security" legislation. However, for a government that is not accountable to the people, the enforcement of 'national security' amounts to an illegitimate authority protecting itself against political change from the grassroots.

Article 23: A Matter of Race?
       The use of the term "national security" in the current Hong Kong context is complex. Tung Chee-hwa has not hesitated to play the race card, claiming that Article 23 legislation is "a matter relating to the national dignity and the glory of the Chinese race". But what does "national" mean in a practical sense, given the rather vague status of Hong Kong as a 'Special Administrative Region' of China? Which authority will be recognised as the body to define and enforce this security, and according to what parameters? These are hardly questions that can be answered by a non-elected government, which places loyalty to Beijing and big business before its own constituents. Emphasising "national security" is often the hallmark of undemocratic and unaccountable forces. Trade union struggles are littered with painful experiences rooted in authoritarian visions of "national security" enforced by illegitimate authority. As for "national dignity and the glory of the Chinese race", we ask why the Chief Executive does not feel our dignity is undermined and our potential stunted by his refusal to seriously contemplate universal suffrage for the "Chinese race".


       A look at the government's revised draft of Article 23 legislation, released earlier this year, confirms that stark threats to grassroots political change in Hong Kong persist despite the professed revisions. Indeed, Section 5.5 of the legislation explicitly states that it would be a criminal offence to aim to "disestablish the basic system of the State as established by the Constitution". This betrays the general, underlying principle of Article 23 legislation: that the existing political structure is sacrosanct, and any attempts at reform or change by the people are, if deemed necessary, to be treated as criminal offences.

       On Saturday, Tung called a press conference and backed down on three elements of the National Security Bill in an attempt to placate the opposition. The provision to outlaw groups connected to organisations banned in mainland China has been dropped, along with plans to allow police to raid houses without a warrant. Journalists who disclose government information will be able to defend themselves by saying their actions were in the public interest.

       Post July 1 concessions on the proscription of societies by the government only removed one of the areas of concern. Section 8A(2)(c) of the proposed amendments to the Societies Ordinance, which allowed the Secretary for Security to proscribe a society on the grounds that it was subordinate to a group banned on the Mainland has been deleted. But given the nature and widespread suspicion regarding the issue of proscription, HKCTU believes that written guarantees should be inserted to protect local groups that face persecution on the Mainland. Moreover, the Minister still has sweeping powers and can proscribe societies in Hong Kong based on information provided by the Beijing government. This is the same government whose courts have already dubbed the Hong Kong-based independent trade unionist Han Dongfang a "hostile element" for his role in promoting independent trade unions in China. The same government that says it was "intimidated" by retired worker Di Tiangui's efforts to organise retired workers in order to pursue legally entitled pensions! A proscribed organisation and its representative may still be excluded from an appeal hearing, and there are no requirements for the government to reasonably explain exclusion. As such, the reasons or evidence for proscription may never be known! Furthermore, because proscription is based on "reasonable belief" of the Secretary, questions of evidence and the standard and burden of proof on appeal remain unclear.

       As it stands, Article 23 proposals still give the Hong Kong government the power to criminalise support for the struggles of organisations proscribed on the mainland. The officials of Hong Kong organisations associated or subordinated to the independent trade union movement on the Mainland would effectively be committing a criminal offence by virtue of their positions, and be subject to a maximum penalty of seven years imprisonment.


       Aside from potentially hindering local and international solidarity with the Chinese independent trade union movement, the activities of union organisations within Hong Kong could also be curbed by aspects of Article 23 legislation. Section 4.2, for instance, states that the criminal offence of inciting "others to create a public disturbance" includes "counsel[ing] disobedience to any law or to any lawful order". Inevitably such a general suggestion leaves room to target industrial actions, union organising, demonstrations, or strikes as actions that will "harm the stability of the SAR". As in Mainland China, "stability" is the operative word here, yet it is vague and open to highly subjective interpretations. Even if no public disturbance takes place, an interpretation to this effect by the police or political offices could lead to actions and events being preventively banned. The increased power of the police through Article 23, however, legislation goes far beyond the banning of actions. The original consultation document indicates that police may be given broader liberties to search premises and seize articles in order to enforce the new legislation.

       Section 2.14 is another alarming aspect of the Article 23 legislation, especially given the level of paranoia and suspicion that Hong Kong people experienced during the SARS outbreak. The section aims to criminalise "misprision of treason", citing failure to report a treasonable offence within a "reasonable time" as a punishable act in itself. The human rights implications of punishing people for not informing on others are worth exploring. At a general societal level, providing a motivation for neighbours to inform on each other does not create a healthy or safe living environment, and breeds suspicion and mistrust among citizens rather than solidarity and respect. During the SARS outbreak, Hong Kong people went through their days suspicious of people around them who coughed, who did not wear a facemask, or who had recently travelled to infected areas. At the peak of the outbreak, tens of thousands of perfectly healthy people seemed to be on the verge of panic while the government again dithered over "stability" and Hong Kong's international image.

       All of the above clauses are serious threats to the participation of Hong Kong people in the political arena, and will harm the chances of any substantial political change i.e. the struggle for universal suffrage in the SAR. In contrast to the 'concerned benevolent image' it cast for itself in TV appearances during the SARS outbreak, Tung Chee-hwa's administration has been quite open and blunt in its contempt for ordinary Hong Kong people. Minister for Security Regina Ip's infamous outburst in which she questioned whether "taxi drivers, Chinese restaurant waiters, service staff at McDonald's hold a copy of the [Article 23] white bill to debate with me article by article?" is testament to this contempt which, judging by the slogans, placards and effigies carried on the July 1 demonstration, is entirely mutual.

A Call for Wider Reform

       HKCTU affiliates and the members turned out in their tens of thousands for the July demonstration. We have won some concessions on the content of the Article 23 bill and a postponement of its second reading and third reading. But the issue is no longer just about unpopular and draconian legislation. It is about the struggle for an elected and representative system of administration. The current administration has had six years to practice the art of government. Its handling of SARS, pursuit of Article 23 legislation, high unemployment and increased poverty are clear evidence that they are not up to the task. HKCTU members and millions of Hong Kong citizens have had enough We want Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa out and replaced by an elected leader, the sooner the better. Article 23 legislation must be rejected as a barrier to political reform. The government's attempts at tinkering and delay to pacify the growing opposition are not enough. Hong Kong's Basic Law does not lay down a timetable for the enactment of security legislation but it does state that 2007 as a date for discussions on progress towards full democracy and the election of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage. HKCTU will continue the struggle for the achievement of the latter as a precondition to any legislation on national security.